We examine the impact of local economic conditions on participation in disability programs for residents of four states: Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 
I. Introduction
In 1993, 3.7 million former workers in the United States were receiving Disability Insurance payments from the Social Security. At the same time, 4.4 million disabled Americans were receiving income from Supplemental Security Income. These two programs accounted for payments to the disabled of nearly $51 billion. Expenditures for disability programs far exceed expenditures on other cash assistance programs. For example, despite the attention it received from politicians and the media, Aid to Families with Dependent Children accounted for payments of less than $23 billion to about 14 million recipients in 1993.
These high levels of disability payments are the result of a 30-year expansion of disability programs expenditures in the United States. Together Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance real expenditures increased 400 percent from 1970 to 1993, and the number of recipients increased 400 percent as well.
By comparison, during the same period Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments increased only 50 percent in real dollar terms, and the number of welfare recipients doubled. Because of the enormous growth in disability programs over the last 30 years and their current importance as a source of public aid, understanding why these programs have grown so rapidly is an important public policy question. 1 The rise in expenditures on Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income coincided with a sharp reduction in the relative earnings of low-skilled men. Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990) , Bound and Johnson (1992) , Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) , Katz and Murphy (1992) , and Murphy and Welch (1992) , to name but a few, examine the fall in earnings of low-skilled workers during the 1970s and 1980s. A decline in the labor force participation of low-skilled men accompanied their decline in wages. Juhn (1992) , analyzing Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement data from 1968 to 1988, finds the decline in labor force participation particularly severe among less-educated men. To what extent has the decline in the earnings of low-skilled men contributed to the increase in disability payments? We address this question in our paper. Parsons (1980 Parsons ( , 1982 addresses a related but distinct issue. He argues that growth in disability programs accounts for a large share of the post-World War II decline in labor force participation. His central piece of evidence is that labor market dropout appears larger for individuals who face more generous Disability Insurance payments. 2 Specifically, the larger the replacement rate -the fraction of pre-disability earnings replaced by the Disability Insurance program -the lower is the probability of working among prime-aged men. Parsons' work, however, has been vigorously challenged. Wolfe (1984a, 1984b) , Bound (1989) , and Bound and Waidmann (1992) , while not denying that disability programs have had some impact on labor force participation, dispute the magnitude of the impact. They point out the potential endogeneity of Parsons' measure of Disability Insurance generosity. 3 Specifically, because the Disability Insurance system is progressive, workers with chronic health problems might have lower earnings that would qualify them to have a higher fraction of their earnings replaced by the Disability Insurance system. In this case, a high replacement rate may simply reflect a worker's chronic health problems and it is not surprising that dropping out of the labor market is positively correlated with health problems (and hence the replacement rate). Bound and Waidmann (1992) suggest that early diagnosis and treatment now allow many men who would have died to survive, but not to recover enough to work. They argue that this accounts for up to 80 percent of the decline in labor force participation for men aged 45 to 54 during the 1970s.
Instead of relying on the replacement rate, and the problems involved with its use, we use variation in local earnings growth within states to see how changes in the local economy affect participation in the Disability Insurance program. We use this approach because, for a specific geographic region in the US, there is an exogenous shock to the value of labor force participation. Because of regulatory changes and the OPEC oil embargo there were a series of sharp increases in the price of coal during the 1970s. The Appalachian regions of Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, in addition to other areas with coal, experienced rising employment and earnings while other areas within relatively short distances suffered the declines in economic activity experienced by the overall American economy. A subsequent bust in the coal market in the 1980s reversed these gains. We use this variation in local economic conditions to identify the impact of labor market conditions on Disability Insurance program participation.
Moreover, because the coal boom persisted for a long period, and the subsequent coal bust persists through today, these economic shocks represent long-term changes in local labor market conditions rather than transitory ones. Our 2 Similarly, Slade (1984) , using data from the 1969 Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, estimates that a 10 percent increase in the generosity of Disability Insurance payments would reduce labor force participation of men between the ages of 58 and 63 by 8.1 percent. 3 Wolfe (1984a, 1984b) note the potential endogeneity of the replacement rate and correct for this endogeneity by predicting Disability Insurance income. As Bound (1991) argues, however, exclusion restrictions of questionable legitimacy are required in order to generate the instruments required for this strategy. See Parsons (1984) for his defense to these challenges. Bound's (1989) approach is to use Disability Insurance applicants who are denied disability insurance as a control group for those who received disability insurance. See Parsons (1991) for a critique of Bound's approach and Bound (1991) for his reply. results suggest that permanent job creation or destruction has a much larger effect on disability program use than more transitory changes in local labor markets.
Establishing the relationship between local economic conditions and Disability Insurance program participation may help inform the debate between Parsons and Bound as well. The central issue in both our question and theirs is the degree to which disability participation and labor force participation are substitutes. A finding, for example, of no relationship between economic opportunities and disability program use would support the contention that the effects of the rise of disability programs on labor force participation are small. Furthermore, the larger the effects of economic opportunities on disability program enrollment, the larger is the substitution potential between work and disability. This suggests a larger role for disability insurance in explaining the decline in primeaged male labor force participation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe features of the two major US disability programs. In Section III we describe the coal boom and bust, documenting the impact that this cycle had on local economic conditions and on the use of disability programs. In Section IV, we discuss our econometric specification and in Section V present the results of our estimation. In Section VI, we offer some concluding comments. The Appendix describes the data we use.
II. Program Description 4
The Disability Insurance program covers all participants in the Social Security system. In order to qualify for Disability Insurance benefits an individual must be deemed disabled by the Social Security Administration.
According to Social Security Administration rules, an individual is deemed disabled if he is unable "to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment." The impairment must last for at least 12 months (or be expected to result in death). The Social Security Administration maintains a list of impairments that, if diagnosed by a physician, qualify individuals for benefits. If individuals have conditions not on this list, however, they may still qualify for benefits if physicians determine that the conditions result in sufficient impairment. In making the determination of impairment, the applicant's age, education, and work experience are considered when determining whether an applicant might still work. The work need not exist in the immediate area in which the claimant lives, nor must a specific job vacancy exist for the individual. Gruber (2000) , using a 36 increase in disability payments in Quebec, finds an estimated labor force nonparticipation elasticity of about 0.3. 4 Unless we otherwise indicate, this discussion follows Committee on Ways and Means (1994, 1996) .
There are no other requirements for participation such as income or asset tests. Disability Insurance payments are based on past earnings. High-income individuals receive more benefits from Disability Insurance than low-income individuals. Caps on the amount that individuals can receive from (or pay into) the Disability Insurance system make the system progressive, and the replacement rate is higher for low-income individuals than for highincome individuals.
The Social Security Act of 1935 established federal grants to states that were to be used for the care of the aged, blind, and disabled. In 1974, the federal Supplemental Security Income program replaced these grants with a federal income-maintenance program to be administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Nationally, about 74 percent of the nearly 6 million Supplemental Security Income recipients qualify for benefits because of a disability. For the purpose of eligibility for Supplemental Security Income benefits, the Social Security Administration defines disabled individuals as those "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determined physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months." Gainful activity is operationally defined as earning $500 a month after impairment-related expenses have been deducted; Muller, Scott and Bye (1996) report that 13 percent of recipients report some labor income while receiving Supplemental Security Income.
The Supplemental Security Income program is designed to be a welfare program. In the words of the Committee on Ways and Means (1994) , "Since its inception SSI has been viewed as the 'program of last resort.' " Because of this, individuals deemed disabled must additionally meet strict asset tests to qualify for Supplemental Security Income and can have no more than $470 per month in earnings or in income from all other assistance programs combined. The Supplemental Security Income application is considered only after the applicant has applied to all other assistance programs for which they qualify. In 1995, the average monthly payment to a Supplemental Security Income recipient was $348 while the average payment to a Disability Insurance recipient was $682. Like other Social Security benefits, benefits from both programs are indexed to the consumer price index.
Taken together, the benefit structure of the Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance programs are quite progressive. Because Supplemental Security Income payments are available only to poor individuals, this makes Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance together more progressive than the Disability Insurance program is alone. Put differently, the replacement rate is larger for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers, and hence the relative reduction in income from withdrawal from the labor market is smaller for disabled, low-wage workers.
III. The Impact of the Coal Boom and Bust on Local Economies
The increases in coal prices in the 1970s were large by any standard . . Figure 1 The coal boom and bust had a fundamental impact on these local economies. We classify counties into one of three groups by their coal reserves. Counties with at least a billion tons of coal reserves are defined as large coal reserve counties. Counties with more than 100 million, but less than a billion, tons of coal reserves are defined as moderate coal reserve counties. Counties with less than 100 million tons of coal reserves are considered outside the coal regions. 5 Counties with moderate coal reserves had per capita income grow 1.5 percent faster in the boom and shrink 1.4 slower in the bust than areas with little or no coal. Similarly, regions with large coal reserves had per capita income grow at a 3.4 percent faster rate in the boom and a 2.3 percent slower rate during the bust than areas with little or no coal. This increase in per capita income during the coal boom was accomplished as population increased. In both the moderate and large coal reserves areas, population grew during the boom and contracted during the bust; see Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2000) .
Ascertaining precisely how these economic shocks affected the residents of the coal-producing areas is difficult. Because these areas are small, residents are not identified in the data sets that labor economists have traditionally used. Indeed, even the Decennial Censuses do not reveal individual county level data from these areas because the counties are too small. It is possible to use the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Decennial Censuses Public Use Micro Samples to obtain some information about the earnings and labor supply of the individuals in the coal region.
The Public Use Micro Samples identifies the location of respondents only at the county group level (less elegantly termed a PUMA in the 1990 Census). In 1970, county groups were collections of "counties" in which at least 250,000 people resided. For the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, county groups or PUMAs were collections of counties in which at least 100,000 people resided. Thus, in large metropolitan areas, a "county group" will be only a portion of a county, but in rural areas county groups will encompass several counties. Moreover, the groupings of counties are not consistent across Censuses, and the groupings are often unrelated to the coal seams.
With these caveats, however, we can identify county groups that contain a relatively large number of workers employed in the coal industry. We define a coal area as any area in which more than 0.5 percent of employment is in the coal industry. A noncoal area is any area that had 0.5 percent or less employment in the coal industry. The timing of the Census is particularly fortunate for us. The 1970 Census, which asks about labor market information for 1969, is before the beginning of the coal boom. The 1980 Census, which ask about labor market information for 1979, is roughly at the peak of coal boom, and the 1990 Census, which ask about labor market information about 1989, is in the coal bust.
In Panel A of Table 1 , we provide simple differences-of-differences estimates of changes in various measures of labor supply and earnings for men and women. We compare the percentage change in labor market outcomes of those who reside in coal areas relative to those in noncoal areas. The labor market outcomes we use are real annual earnings, annual hours worked, annual weeks worked, hours per week, whether the respondent is in the labor force, and average real wage.
The differences are stark. Real, annual earnings of men in coal areas grew 13 percent faster between 1969
and 1979 than in noncoal areas. Yet, changes annual hours worked were virtually identical to those in noncoal areas.
Labor force participation for both men and women grew modestly faster in coal areas than noncoal areas (about 3 percent faster). The average real wage, however, increased 17 percent faster for men and 10 percent faster for women in coal areas than in noncoal areas. Thus, during the coal boom, the increased earnings in the coal areas resulted largely from increases in hourly compensation rather than labor supply.
Wages also change dramatically between 1979 and 1989 although in the opposite direction of the coal boom. Wages declined about 8 percent in coal areas relative to noncoal areas. There is more evidence, however, that coal bust affected labor supply. The relative decline in earnings among working men and women was larger than the change in wages. Labor force participation declined for men and weeks worked declined for both men and women in coal areas relative to noncoal areas.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we divide the men in the coal areas by whether they work in the coal industry. 6 We again use all workers in noncoal areas as our comparison group. Not surprisingly, the earnings of coal workers increased much faster than the earnings of noncoal workers during the boom. Wages grew nearly 31 percent for coal workers and 15 percent for noncoal workers relative to those in noncoal areas. Thus, the coal boom clearly effected the wages of both coal miners as well as other workers in coal areas. As one would suspect, the labor supply responses of coal workers increased relative to those of workers in the noncoal industries. In the bust, the decline in real average wages was 8.1 percent for workers in the coal industry and 8.0 percent for those not in the coal industry.
While the coal boom substantially increased earnings in coal-producing areas within Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, the economic benefits of the coal boom were not spread evenly across the region.
Even in the Appalachian areas of these four states, 53 of the 186 counties have little or no coal reserves, and most of the remaining 144 counties outside Appalachia have no coal. Among those counties with reserves there are great differences in coal endowments. In Figure 2 , we map the endowment of coal within the region. We divide the counties into three groups: counties with little or no coal (less than 100 million tons of coal), counties with at least 100 million tons of coal but less than a billion tons of coal, and counties with at least a billion tons of coal. Figure 2 shows three major coal seams. The first major seam lies in Western Kentucky, a part of the Illinois coal basin. The second major seam -the Appalachian Basin -runs through Eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, Western Pennsylvania, and Eastern Ohio. Finally, Eastern Pennsylvania contains a major seam that is largely anthracite, or hard coal.
In Figure 3 , we provide a map of the region's economic growth from 1983 to 1993. This is a period of declining coal prices. We divide counties into quartiles based on the average growth of county earnings. A 
IV. Econometric Specifications
Figures 2 through 4 visually display our econometric strategy. We wish to correlate intrastate variation in earnings that arises from coal boom and bust to intrastate variation in Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance payments. The use of intrastate variation allows us to control for interstate differences in policies that affect Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance expenditures. As Gruber and Kubik (1997) emphasize, 6 Virtually no women are employed in the coal industry so we do not repeat this exercise for women.
applications for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income are made to state-appointed boards that differ from state to state. Kubik (1999) and Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (1997) (1) will purge the data of any fixed effects. Our use of state-year dummy variables to control for programmatic changes purges the dependent variable of its time series variations. Similarly, this year-fixed effect approach purges the growth in earnings of all state-specific time-series variations as well. Identification of the effect of county earnings growth on disability caseloads comes from the annual deviations from a state's averages.
Neither coal prices nor coal endowments plays any role in equation (1). This equation simply models the correlation between changes in a county's wage bill and changes in its disability role regardless of the source of the change in the wage bill. The price of coal alters the wage bill through increasing the demand for labor. To capture this econometrically we use a two-stage model. The first stage models the relationship between the wage bill and the value of coal reserves in a county (a function of the coal price and the county's endowment of coal). The second stage then models how these coal price-induced movements in the wage bill affected disability program participation.
The first-stage equation for the change in (log) earnings is 7 We control for whether or not the county is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area for the 1990 Census, the logarithm of the county's population, the log difference in the county's population, and the fraction of earnings in 1969 from manufacturing industries. We control for metropolitan status because of our concern that persons with disabilities may move to a metropolitan area for better access to health care. Similarly, we control for population to proxy, in part, for access to medical care and the provision of public services such as transportation that may attract individuals with disabilities. 
V. Results
In what follows we estimate the impact of earnings growth on Supplemental Security Income and Disability
Insurance program expenditures for counties in Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample and mixed evidence on the relationship between earnings growth and program participation. On the average, coal prices increased 9.4 percent per year during the coal boom and decreased 4.1 percent per year during the coal bust. The average coal reserves in counties in the large seam areas is 2.5 billion tons, in the moderate seam areas it is 412 million tons and reserves outside of the coal regions are less than 7 million tons. When coal prices were rising, average growth in county earnings was much higher inside the coal regions than outside. During the coal boom, the growth in average county earnings was 5.8 percent for counties with large coal reserves, 3.4 percent for counties with moderate coal reserves, and 2.2 percent for counties without coal. During the use the fraction of earnings from manufacturing industries in 1969 to control for any impact of industry structure on disability. Eliminating these controls has little impact on the results discussed below. 8 Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) report that 1.6 percent of the caseload exited in 1976. They suggest that this rate has also been falling over time.
bust, non-coal counties grew 2.7 percent annually while coal counties had essentially no earnings growth. Also, counties in the seam differ from other counties in several ways. Compared to the non-coal counties, counties with the large coal reserves have fewer residents, are less likely to be in a metropolitan area, and have less manufacturing.
The moderate coal counties are remarkably similar to the non-coal counties in these dimensions.
A. Semi-Parametric Estimates
We estimate four different models for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance program payments.
First, we estimate the ordinary least squares model using year-fixed effects, the log difference in earnings, and other covariates. We refer to this as the change in earnings and will, casually, interpret this variable as the +percentage change in real earnings. In the next specifications, we use two-stage least squares, with the change in the value of coal reserves and two of its lags as instruments. For all estimates, t-statistics are reported using Huber-White standard errors. 9 Because the functional form is a double-log model, the parameter estimate for the change in earnings can be interpreted as an elasticity of the change in payments for a change in the level of the county's real earnings. We then repeat the estimation excluding the control variables.
We begin our analysis with the ordinary least squares estimates of equation (1) for Disability Insurance payments. The ordinary least squares estimates indicate an extremely weak link between earnings growth and the growth in Disability Insurance payments. In column (1) of Panel A of Table 3 , we present the ordinary least squares estimate for the model with all covariates. Earnings growth appears to have no effect on the growth of Disability Insurance payments.
These estimates, however, do not focus on the coal price-induced changes in county earnings. In order to implement our two-stage model (equations 2 and 3) we first must specify a measure for the value of a county's coal reserves. We use the log differences in the real price as the measure of price changes. This measure of the change in coal prices is multiplied by the log of coal reserves. Because new mines require some setup time, we use two lags of this variable as well.
In column (2) of Panel A, we provide the two-stage least squares estimates of equation (3) 
The rate of change in expenditures is just the difference between the rate of inflows and outflows. Combining information from Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) and from the SSA Bulletin (1981), 1 γ , the annual rate of outflows appears to be approximately 0.089. 10 Between 1970 and 1995, the real expenditures of the DI system grew at annual rate of 7.9 percent. As % 0.079 E ∆ = , the rate of inflows must have been 16.8 percent (
Now suppose the impact of the coal boom reduces Disability Insurance expenditures solely through changes in the inflow of new cases. For the coal areas we have
from the authors on request, we re-estimate our models using the method that Conley (1999) proposes. The results are robust to corrections for spatial autocorrelation. 10 There are two components to 1 γ (the outflow rate), the rate at which people "recover" from their disability and the rate at which the caseload population "ages out" of Disability Insurance. Using 1978 data, Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) estimate that a very small fraction (1.6 %) of the caseload "recovers" each year. Recipients also leave the Disability Insurance program at age 65 when the Social Security Administration transfers the recipient to old age retirement. In 1978, according to the Social Security Supplemental Bulletin, 7.3% of the Disability Insurance caseload was 64 years of age and would age out. where 1 α < denotes the rate of reduction of new cases arising from the coal boom. Differencing the two percentage growth equations, we have
Over the boom, large coal counties grew 3.6 percent faster than counties with little or no coal. The point estimate in Table 3 suggest this 3.6 percent increase in earnings reduces Disability Insurance expenditures 1.26 percent so that 0.0126 0.075 0.168 α ≈ ≈ . Thus, the 3.6 percent increase in earnings reduced the number of new entrants by 7.5 percent.
If some of the stock of recipients did return to work, this calculation overestimates the responsiveness of the new entrants.
In Panel B of Table 3 , we repeat the analysis for Supplemental Security Income payments. Again, the ordinary least squares estimates, reported in columns (1) and (3), indicate only an extremely weak link between earnings growth and the growth in Supplemental Security Income payments. While the estimated coefficient on earnings growth is negative, it is statistically insignificant and economically inconsequential. A 10 percent increase in earnings in a county would reduce Supplemental Security Income payments by only 0.2 percent.
In columns (2) and (4) of Panel A, we provide the two-stage least squares estimates of equation (3) higher earnings may push the entire family above the maximum allowable income. Thus, both of these factors contribute to the correlation between local economic conditions and Supplemental Security Income participation.
We have shown that for the four states the energy boom of the 1970s and the subsequent economic collapse of the coal fields significantly affected disability program participation. Do the large impacts of local economic conditions on disability program participation generalize to other regions? There are at least two distinct issues.
First, we have identified the impact of earnings growth on changes in disability payments using movements in coal prices, and coal is mined predominately in rural areas. It is possible that the relationship between earnings growth and disability payments is intrinsically different in rural areas than in urban areas. Because coal areas are rural, physicians are likely to know their patients more intimately than do physicians in cities. Although Social Security
Administration rules forbid physicians from taking into account the state of the local economy, physicians may be more willing to certify a patient as disabled when they know that the patient is unlikely to be able to find alternative employment and are familiar with the economic dislocation that the patient's family is experiencing. If this is so, then the applicability of this study to large urban areas may be limited.
On the other hand, the impact of changes in county earnings on changes in Supplemental Security Income A second possible issue is perhaps more important. The coal industry employs a much different set of workers than the economy as a whole. In Table 4 , we describe the workers employed in the coal mining industry in Censuses, we see evidence of the industry aging somewhat. The data also document that coal mining is an industry whose workers have very limited education. Even in 1990, 30 percent of the industry was comprised of workers without a high school diploma. 11 Thus, the coal industry employs a disproportionate number of low-skilled workers.
To get a feel for how these results might generalize, we consider the impact of the decline in the primary Census. The results indicate that a 10 percent decline in earnings is associated with a 3.6 percent increase in Disability Insurance payments, a result that is quite similar to our estimates from the coal-producing regions. In column (3), we provide estimates for the first-stage regression, documenting that earnings within the county are highly correlated with the fraction of male employment in primary metals in 1970. Finally, in column (4), we present the reduced-form regression results, which suggest that during the period of massive closing of steel plants, areas with a historically large fraction of workers in the primary metals industries had Disability Insurance payments grow faster than elsewhere. Thus, results from both the coal and primary metals industries suggest that declines in these industries are associated with growth in disability payments.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we present similar evidence for Supplemental Security Income payments. Again, the ordinary least squares estimates indicate no statistically significant relationship between local labor market earnings and Supplemental Security Income payments. The two-stage least squares results, however, suggest that a 10 percent decline in earnings is associated with a 10 percent increase in payments. Thus, we again find that the decline Supplemental Security Income payments exceed the decline in Disability Insurance payments.
If low-skilled workers are more likely to pursue disability benefits when displaced from their jobs, this suggests that other sources of economic growth are likely to lead to more modest declines in disability program participation. This said, the decline in the economic opportunities of low-skilled workers is well documented. For this reason, we believe that this study has much to say about the increase in disability program participation among men, particularly among low-skilled men.
B. Nonparametric Estimates
In this section, we begin to explore why the magnitude of instrumental variables estimates are so much larger than the magnitude of the ordinary least squares estimates. In this section, we construct nonparametric estimates that allow us to examine more closely the variation that produces the large instrumental variables estimates. These nonparametric estimates better identify the impact of the coal price-induced earnings growth on the growth in disability payments.
As the controls have little impact on the estimated coefficient on county earnings growth, we exclude them from our nonparametric analysis. As before, we classify counties into one of three coal regions. Counties with at least a billion tons of coal reserves are defined as large coal reserve counties. Counties with more than 100 million, but less than a billion, tons of coal reserves are defined as moderate coal reserve counties. Counties with less than 100 million tons of coal reserves are considered outside the coal region. We refer to these categories as the "region" of the county. We also divide the data into three periods: the boom years between 1970 and 1977 (Boom) is a constant for all years. Thus, the use of region and time indicators for our instrument series insures that we use only long-term differences in growth rates to identify the impact of earnings on disability payments.
To investigate the relationship among a county's earnings growth, its endowment of coal, and the coal price cycle, the average growth in county earnings in presented for the coal boom, peak, and bust, which are estimated from equation (2′). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the average economic performance of counties with large and moderate coal reserves relative to counties with small or no reserves of coal. Consistent with Figure 3 , counties with moderate coal reserves did modestly better during the boom period, averaging about 1.4 percent more growth in earnings than counties with little or no coal. Counties with large reserves of coal grew much faster, averaging a growth rate of 3.5 percent more than the growth rate of counties with little or no coal. During the bust, coal counties had much slower growth in county earnings relative to noncoal counties.
A similar exercise is conducted to investigate the relationship between a county's Disability Insurance payment growth and its geographic location relative to the coal regions and period of the coal price cycle. We
where in this model ist y ∆ is the log difference in county Disability Insurance payments. The coefficients, τ , are simply the average growth in Disability Insurance payments for counties with large coal and with moderate coal reserves relative to counties with little or no coal for each of the three time periods. We report these in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 . During the coal boom, Disability Insurance payments grew 3.0 percent slower in counties with large coal reserves relative to counties with little or no coal reserves and grew 1.6 percent slower in counties with moderate coal reserves relative to counties with little or no coal reserves.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 , we present the average county growth in Supplemental Security Income payments for counties with large coal reserves and with moderate coal reserves relative to counties with little or no coal. We see that during the coal boom, counties with moderate coal reserves had Supplemental Security Income payments grow 0.4 percent slower and counties with large coal reserves had Supplemental Security Income payments grow 1.7 percent slower than non-coal counties. During the coal bust, Supplemental Security Income grew much faster in the coal areas than in the non-coal areas. Relative to non-coal areas, the Supplemental Security Income payments grew 0.4 percent faster in the counties with moderate coal reserves and 1.4 percent faster in the counties with large coal reserves.
In the spirit of Wald (1940) and Angrist (1990) , we may exploit this variation in region and coal prices to form several non-parametric instrumental variables estimators of the impact of earnings on Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income payments. We report the estimates in Table 7 , providing the Disability Insurance estimates in Panel A and the Supplemental Security Income estimates in Panel B. Consider first the Supplemental Security Income estimates. Using data for the boom period alone, we obtain an elasticity estimate of -0.46; using data from the bust period alone, we obtain an elasticity estimate of -0.37, which we view as quite similar. Similarly, when we use two-way comparisons between the region with large coal reserves and one of the other regions, we get reasonably similar elasticity estimates.
In contrast, we find a great deal of instability in our Disability Insurance estimates. For example, we find estimates from the boom period suggest an estimate of -0.89. This elasticity is very large, and, in our view, is implausibly large. Moreover, the estimated elasticity is even more negative in the peak, albeit statistically insignificant, and in the bust the estimated elasticity is actually positive, although again insignificant. Obviously, the intertemporal volatility of the elasticity estimates calls into question the point estimates that we presented in Tables 2   and 3 .
A closer examination of Table 6 , however, suggests a reason for the strong correlation between local economic conditions and Disability Insurance program payments during the boom yet no correlation during the bust.
While not statistically significant, when coal and non-coal areas are experiencing the same growth in their local economies (1978-82) coal counties appear to have Disability Insurance payments expanding much more slowly than non-coal areas. It may be that there is a permanently lower growth rate of Disability Insurance payments in areas with coal. If this is true then this difference in the baseline growth rate of Disability Insurance payments exacerbates the negative correlation between local economic conditions and Disability Insurance growth rates during the boom while reducing the measured effect during the bust.
In order to test our contention that growth rates in Disability Insurance payments vary by region, we reestimate our nonparametric model including region fixed effects. Table 8 presents the results from this model. In row (1), we report the non-parametric estimates with fixed effects for whether the county has little or no coal, moderate coal reserves, or large coal reserves. As we expected given Table 6 , the fixed effects indicate that Disability Insurance payment growth is slower in areas with moderate coal reserves than in areas with little or no coal and even slower in areas with large endowments of coal. Controlling for this, the estimated impact of earnings growth on Disability Insurance payments increases somewhat. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in earnings would decrease Disability Insurance payments about 3.9 percent.
In the next three rows, we re-estimate the model using only two of three regions -counties with little or no coal and moderate coal reserves in row (2), counties with little or no coal and large reserves in row (3), and counties with moderate reserves and large reserves in row (4). Each of these two-way comparisons provides similar estimates of the magnitude of the impact of earnings on Disability Insurance payments with the estimates ranging from -0.37 to -0.41, and each is statistically significant. In the next three rows, we re-estimate the model using only two of the three periods: the peak and bust in row (5), the boom and bust in row (6), and the boom and peak in row (7). For the peak and bust sample and the boom and bust sample, the estimated coefficients are again quite similar, -0.41 and -0.39, respectively, and both are statistically significant. For the boom and peak sample, the point estimate is -0.30, but it is imprecisely estimated.
The presence of the region fixed effects suggests that the semi-parametric estimates in Table 3 may be biased as well. In the last two rows, we re-estimate the semi-parametric two-stage least squares models using a specification similar to that in column (4) of Table 3 . In row (8), we re-estimate including region fixed effects for the model, and in row (9), we estimate the model with county fixed effects, with both models providing very similar estimates. The estimates imply that a 10 percent increase in county earnings would reduce Disability Insurance payments about 2.7 percent. Finally, in row (10), we reestimate the nonparametric model with county fixed effects.
The results imply that a 10 percent increase in county earnings would reduce Disability Insurance payments about 3.9 percent. 12 Again, the nonparametric instrumental variable estimate is larger than the two-stage least squares estimate.
For both programs and for both the coal and steel industries, the magnitudes of the instrumental variables estimates are several times the magnitude of the ordinary least squares estimates. Traditionally, researchers have sought to explain such differences by suggesting that there is an endogenous relationship between county economic conditions and the growth in disability payments. While we certainly would not deny the potential for such endogeneity, we do not feel this is the major reason for the differences. We believe the instrumental variables estimates are larger than the ordinary least squares estimates because estimated growth in earnings from the first- To illustrate this argument, we divided the earnings series into the predicted series and the residual of the series, entering both into a regression otherwise specified as in column (4) of Table 3 . Because the predicted series and its residual are orthogonal, this leaves unchanged the coefficient on predicted earnings. If there were a substantial endogeneity problem, however, one would suspect that the residual earnings growth, for instance, might be positively correlated with the growth in Supplemental Security Income payments. This is not the case. The coefficient on residual earnings growth is about -0.004, with a standard error of 0.014. For the Disability Insurance program, the coefficient on residual earnings is positive, 0.009, but is only about half the size of its standard error, 0.016. In our view, this indicates that the county-level earnings series is excessively volatile rather than, strictly speaking, endogenous. The predicted earnings series seems to better capture the economic opportunity than the much more volatile actual earnings series. This is not surprising. Rational economic agents are forward looking, basing their behavior on current conditions and their forecasts of future conditions. Undoubtedly, their forecasts are smoother than realized economic time series. Our instrumental variables estimates reduce the volatility of earnings growth, which probably better reflect the economic prospects of these agents. This is particularly true when we use the region and period interaction as instruments. The variation we use for identification in this specification is simply the mean difference in growth rates across the regions during the boom, peak, and bust. No within region variation or within period variation remains in the predicted series. Changes in local economic conditions that are correlated with these long-run changes in the value of coal reflect changes in economic opportunity than the year-to-year variation that comes and goes with business cycles. As a test of this argument, we re-ran our analysis on a new dependent variable that should be less responsive to permanent changes in economic conditions and more responsive to transitory changes.
Unemployment insurance is designed to act as a buffer for business cycle fluctuations. We would therefore expect unemployment insurance expenditures to be quite sensitive to transitory fluctuations in county-level earnings.
Because benefits are time-limited it is less obvious that unemployment insurance expenditures should be particularly sensitive to permanent changes in economic conditions. Using information on unemployment insurance expenditures by county from the BEA data, we estimate the ordinary least squares and instrumental variables models with unemployment insurance expenditures as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 9 .
We see that the ordinary least squares coefficient on earnings is greater than -0.5 and highly significant.
Using our region and time period indicators as instruments, however, we find that the estimated effect of local economic conditions on unemployment insurance expenditures is near zero. These results are in direct contrast to the results for DI and SSI participation in which using these same instrumental variables increased the magnitude of the coefficient substantially. These results provide some support for our argument that the instruments role in the SSI and DI participation examples is extracting the variation related to the permanent, and not transitory, component of earnings.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we used variations in local labor market conditions to estimate the impact of economic growth on disability program participation. To obtain an exogenous shock to local economies, we used data from four coalproducing states and used the coal boom and bust as a natural experiment to identify the impact of earnings growth on disability program participation. The coal boom substantially increased earnings in coal-producing areas within the region. The economic benefits of the coal boom, however, were not spread evenly across the region. Even in the Appalachian areas of Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, 53 of the 186 counties have little or no coal reserves, and among those counties with coal reserves there are great differences in endowments. We used the variation in the price of coal over time combined with the variation in coal reserves across space (together, the value of a county's coal reserve) to investigate the effects of economic growth and decline on disability program participation. We found that for the Social Security Disability program, the elasticity of program payments with in the coefficient on earnings growth compared with the OLS estimate, the coefficient was only about one-sixth the magnitude of the two-stage least squares estimates. Smoothing across space is the more important component.
respect to local earnings is about -0.3 or -0.4. For Supplemental Security Income, the elasticity is somewhat larger, between -0.4 and -0.7.
Our results suggest that permanent job creation or destruction has a much larger effect on disability program use than more transitory local-labor market changes. This is supported by the lack of correlation between coal-price induced changes in the local economy and the use of the unemployment insurance program, a program with timelimited benefits. It is also supported by nearly identical findings for a different source of permanent job destruction, the collapse of the steel industry on Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income program use.
Given the decline in earnings of low-skilled workers, our findings may help explain the findings of Juhn (1992), who documents that the decline in labor force participation is particularly severe among less-educated men.
Our use of coal prices and endowments provides a strategy for examining the impact of local earnings growth on a host of outcomes. For example, economists may be concerned about the impact of local labor market conditions on high school and college enrollments, welfare participation, crime, out-of-wedlock births, and household formation.
In each case, the energy boom and bust may provide important evidence about the impact of local labor market shocks on these outcomes. Bound and Waidmann (1992) note that there are potentially important policy implications about the responsiveness to disability program participation to economic incentives. If the availability and generosity of disability programs has reduced labor force attachment because of "malingering," if those receiving disability payments are "perfectly capable of working," then the "social costs of the disability transfers have been high and the target efficiency low" (p. 1417). An immediate question arises: Do are results provide evidence of this malingering?
The idea that potential claimants are guilty of malingering if they respond to economic incentives appears predicated on a notion of disability as a dichotomous state. In this view, people with disabilities are incapable of working so those who respond to economic incentives must not be disabled. This view, however, is most certainly incorrect. Professional athletes often participate in their sports with injuries that would render most of us disabled.
Presumably, the outstanding remuneration associated with participating renders the undeniable pain associated with their injuries endurable. One could interpret the results that we present as evidence of the disabled workers' commitment to the labor market. Individuals who would otherwise qualify for disability programs work when provided with the opportunity. When disabilities are viewed as a continuum, little is learned about whether the existing programs are targeting the "truly needy" by examining the responsiveness of those with disabilities to economic shocks. Rather, their responsiveness to economic shocks informs us about the number of individuals for whom participation in disability programs is a marginal decision. Whether these recipients should be admitted to disability programs cannot be answered by looking at their responses to economic shocks.
Our analysis can provide, however, insight into why disability program participation has increased.
Because the disability system in the United States is relatively more generous for low-wage workers, the disincentive effects of the program are necessarily greatest for these workers. Thus, one suspects that the decline in labor force opportunities for low-skilled workers affected the rate of participation in disability programs, but the magnitude of this effect is an open question. For two industries that employ low-skilled workers, our analysis suggests the changes in the economic opportunities had sizeable impacts on disability caseloads and expenditures.
VII. Appendix: Data Description
All dollar values are deflated by the CPIU with the base year index as 1983. 1970, 1980, and 1990 Decennial Censuses. Coal areas are defined as PUMAs or County groups with over 0.5 percent of the workforce employed in the coal area. We impute real average wages per hour by taking sum of total wage and salary earnings, self-employment earnings, and farm earnings then dividing by annual hours. Annual hours are the product of the respondent's weeks worked last year and average hours worked last year. Notes: Authors' calculation from data sources given in the appendix. The dependent variables in columns (1), (2), and (4) are the log difference in real Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income payments in 1987 and 1982 and is the log differences in earnings in column (3). We give absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. We use Huber-White robust variances to estimate t-statistics. Notes: Authors' calculation from data sources given in the appendix. All regressions contain state-year fixed effects. We report absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses calculated using Huber-White standard errors, and we adjust standard errors to account for possible non-independence using Stata's cluster command. Ntes: Authors' calculation from data sources given in the appendix. All regressions contain state-year fixed effects. We report absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses calculated using Huber-White standard errors, and we adjust standard errors to account for possible nonindependence using Stata's cluster command. ------Notes: Authors' calculation from data sources given in the appendix. All regressions contain state-year fixed effects. We report absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses calculated using Huber-White standard errors, and we adjust standard errors to account for possible nonindependence using Stata's cluster command. Dependent variable is the logarithm of real Disability Insurance payments. Notes: Authors' calculation from data sources given in the appendix. Dependent variable is the log of real Unemployment Insurance payments. We give absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. We use Huber-White robust variances to estimate t-statistics, and we adjust standard errors to account for possible non-independence using Stata's cluster command. There are 330 counties in the four-state region. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Q u a rt ile o f M e a n G r o w t h in E a r n in g s , 1 9 8 3 -9 3 1 s t Q u a r tile 2 n d Q u a r t ile 3 rd Q u a rtile 4 t h Q u a rt ile
